Abstract. The sequence of bivariate random variables (Xn,Yn), n = 0,1,..., is observed successively by two players whose strategies are Markov times (ri, T2). The game terminates at the first moment when one of them decides to quit the game and take the reward X T , r = min {ri, 7*2} . The player 1 makes decisions first, i.e. if T\ = T2 he gets X T .
Introduction
We will consider a two-person non-zero-sum stopping game which has some specific reward functions structure described by the sequence of bivariate random variables (X N , Y N ), n € N = {0,1,...}, defined on a probability space P) and such that (X N ,Y N ) are ^"-measurable, where FN^n £ N, is an increasing filtration on (ii, T, P) representing observable events till the moment n. Let A denote the set of Maxkov times with respect to {Fn, n £ N} and let (Ti,T2) € A x A be the game strategy of the pair of the players, the player 1 and 2, say. Moreover, define G n = min{X", Y" n } and H N = max{X n , Y N } and assume that the following condition is fulfilled
{A)
£(suptf+) < 00, £(sup G~) < 00.
n£N neN
The players' 1 and 2 rewards are defined as follows ( Let us note that the above structure of rewards has clear interpretation. The game terminates at the first random moment r = min{ri , 72}when one of the players decides to stop it and take the associate reward X T . Then the other player gets the reward Y T . Moreover, the structure of Z 1 (ti, 72), i = 1,2, is such that the player 1 is privileged, i.e. at each moment n while observing rewards X n , Y n he decides first whether to stop or to continue the game. Only in the latter case the player 2 decides whether to stop or to continue the game. In the former case the game terminates, otherwise it is continued. The aim of each player is to make his mean reward V 1 (Yi, T2) = E(Z l (Ti,T2)), i -1,2, as large as possible. Hence, we look for a pair of Markov times (r^,T£) which is an equilibrium point ( Nash solution ) of the game, written in a normal way as a triple r = {A x A, V 1 , V 2 ).
Let us recall that the game strategy (rj*€ A x A is an equilibrium point if the below inequalities are satisfied, for any (Ti,T2) € A x A, Such games, with specific sequences of rewards (X n ,Y n ),n 6 N, were investigated in a series of papers, e.g. [3, 5, 11, 13, 15] , to list a few. These games were mostly inspired by the secretary type problems which are beautifully described from a historical perspective in the survey paper [10] .
A general game with the rewards (1) and (2) was analyzed in [4] in a finite horizon case and an infinite horizon game was investigated in [7] where mostly the existence of an equilibrium point has been proved. Some weaker existence results are obtained in [6] where it has been assumed addtionally that rewards are functions of a homogenous Markov chain {( n , n 6 N}, i.e. Two-person stopping game of a more general form of rewards, but satisfying some constraints were investigated in [12, 16] . To avoid these constraints and still get existence type results for equilibrium points one must consider more general class of game strategies, i.e. randomized stopping times. Such trials are described in [9, 15, 16] .
In Section 2 we state basic notions, definitions and Lemma 1 which is essential for obtaining results on optimal equilibrium points in some natural class of game strategies, which are subject of investigation in Section 3.
Preliminaries
In this Section we state basic notions and definitions needed for investigating equilibria.
In what follows, instead of the set A of Markov times we will use an equivalent set of players' strategies, say, D. Namely, let r € A and define <f> = {<j> n , n £ N}, where <p n = I{ T=n y. Hence, 4> € D = the set of sequences of 0-1 valued {T n , n € N} adapted random variables. Moreover, for any <j> € D there exists r in A defined as inf{n > 0 : <f> n = 1}, where inf{0} = oo. For the sake of simplicity of derivations we will consider an equivalent
where V^faip) = E^fa^)), Z^frip) = Z*( t I, t 2) with the above one to one correspondence between (<j>,tp) and (n ,T2).
Let (<F>,IP) € D x D and, for n € N, denote by the reward for the player i if the game begins at the moment n and the part of the strategy (<f>,tp), starting at n, is used. Then, we have the below relations For n = 0, let = {0, ÎÎ}. Then, (<f>,ip) satisfying (5), (6) In what follows we will focus attention on equilibrium points in DQ. Moreover, we will use 
DEFINITION 3.
Let (<p*,ip*) be an optimal equilibrium point in Do and let < = E(Zi(P,r) I < = E(Zl(F,r) I ^n). Then, {«,<), n e N} is called the sequence of optimal game values.
In [7] there is given a construction of equilibrium points of the game Q via some sequence {/in, n £ N} which is {Tn-,fi e N} adapted and satisfies the following conditions, for n e N, a.s., The below Lemma will be useful
LEMMA 1. Suppose that E(sup n€N G+) < oo and E(G~) < oo. Let M be the set of sequences of random variables /x = {/xn, n G N} which are {Tn, n G N} adapted and satisfy Conditions (B) and (C). Then, (a) M is not empty, (b) there exists a maximal element in M, say n*, i.e. for any fi G M elements of sequences
are such that ¿i* > [i n , a.s., for any n G N. [7] , i.e. /x* is the limit of a sequence of finite sequences defined as follows. For k > 1 and n = k -1,..., 0, let 
Proof, (a) Existence of // G M is proved in [7] (Proposition, p. 375). (b) Let /i = {n n , n G N} G M and let us construct (£* G M as in Proposition in
= v k , (7) ~k I ^n if X n > E(/j, n+ 1 | F n ),
Main results
In this Section we will show that for each game an optimal equilibrium point does not have to exist. Moreover, if it exists we will give its form and derive Bellman's type equations for optimal game values.
The theorem below gives the form of game values for any equilibrium point in Dq. 
where dn, Sn are 0 -1 valued random variables {!Fn, n € N} adapted and <f>n = dn, ipn = 6n, n 6 N.
(ii) {¡j,n, n G N} satisfies Conditions (B) and (C).
Proof, (i) Note that the sequence of game values satisfies the relations, a.s.,
since by definition antp), ¡j,n = ip). Combining the above with the assumption an > fin, a.s., and the definition of equilibrium points at n, n € N, we get after some axithmetic the Bellman equations of (i).
(ii) Let n € N, rn = inf{fc > n : (j>n = 1 or il>n = 1}, where inf{0} = oo. Prom the Bellman equations we get
which is Condition (B). Moreover, the Bellman equations imply immediately Condition (C). 
Proof. The forms of (<f>, ip) and its corresponding optimal game values are the consequences of Lemma 1, formulas (8), (9), and Theorem 1.
• COROLLARY. There are games Q for which optimal equilibrium points do not exist.
Proof. Let Q be a game of the considered type with finite horizon N. Let (-X"I, Yi),..., (XJV,Y}V) be independent bivariate random variables defined on some probability space (ii, T, P) and 
